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PART I.
OvER seven years have passed since the Supreme
Court, in Sanderson v. The Pennsylvania Coal Company,'
-reversed their previous decisions in -the same case.' The
final judgment of the court has been considered in several
more recent cases and at this lapse of time the principles
of the decision may be impartially and critically considered.
The facts are well known. To rehearse them briefly
we find that the plaintiff, Sanderson, purchased in 1868 a
tract of land within the limits of the city of Scranton
through which flowed "Meadow Brook," a seven-feet wide
stream of excellent water. The plaintiff was in part
induced to purchase his land on account of this stream, the
*condition of which he investigated with sonie care. He
built a handsome.residence near by; dammed the stream
to make ponds for ice and fish, and used the water in his
1

1"3 Pa. St., 126 (I886).

2 86 Pa. St., 4oi; 94 Pa. St., 302; 102
I

Pa. St., 370.

THE NATURAL

USE

OF LAND.

home for domestic and culinary purposes. A few years
.thereafter the defendant corporation sunk their shaft and
drove several tunnels in their land which comprised some
16oo acres, situated on the same stream about three miles
above the plaintiffs residence. Water, contaminated and
polluted by the coal and minerals, not only flowed from the
drifts, but also collected in this shaft from which it was
pumped to the surface and conveyed by a ditch or conduit
to the Gypsy Grove swamp on the defendant's land, through.
which the Meadow Brook flowed. As a consequence the
water of this stream became acid and unfit for: use; the
fish in the stream were killed;, the trees along its bank
died; the water-pipes were corroded; and, finally, in 1875,
the plaintiff abandoned the use of the water and used
instead the water supplied by public water-works. The
plaintiff thereupon brought an action of trespass on the
case to recover damages.
Upon the first trial the court entered a non-suit, on
the ground that the discharge of the mine water was necessary and was conducted without negligence or malice, and
that the plaintiff's damage was damnum absque injuria.

The Supreme Court .was, in 1878, composed of AGNEW,
C. J., and SHEARSWOOD, MERcuR, GORDON, PAXSON,
TRUNiEY and WOODWARD, JJ. Before these judges it was
forcibly argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the.
mining of anthracite coal could not be carried on in any
other way. That the coal lies at great depth beneath the
surface and cannot be mined without driving tunnels or
shafts into the ground; that the collection of acidulated
mine water was inevitable; that the mines are, and necessarily must be, freed from this water by pumping them out;
that the water so removed must find its way to the surface
streams; that the ordinary rules which prohibit the fouling
of streams by a riparian owner could not be applied in such
a case without destroying one of the greatest industries of
the State and prohibiting the owners of mines from the
ordinary development of their property.
Justice WOODWARD delivered the opinion of the
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majority of the court (Justice PAXSON dissenting). It was
held wit'i great reason that the magnitude of the interests
involved should not lead tothe "relaxation of legal liabilities and the remission of legal duties," although "the proprietors of large and useful interests should not be hampered
or hindered for frivolous or trifling causes."
But the case
was considered to fall within the general rule that a riparian owner had no right to injure the quality of the water
to the detriment of others, and stress was laid upon the
defendant's use of ."an artificial water-course from the
mines to Meadow Brook."
Upon this latter point the writer will observe although
the water-course, or conduit, in question appears to have
been laid from the shaft to the swamp in which Meadow
Brook took its rise that the water would, in all probability
and almost certainly, have flowed there anyway. One of the
plaintiis witnesses, an engineer, testified on the secondtrial' that it might have been thrown into Little Roaring
Brook, but wbuld not have flowed there naturally, if emptied on the ground at the head of the shaft. Indeed, Sanderson himself, a civil engineer by profession, testified on

cross-examination in the second trial : ' I.Q. Where could
The Pennsylvania Coal Company have taken the water to
if they hadn't let it run into Meadow Brook? A. They
could very easy take it across to the water shed, northeast
of Meadow Brook, going down toward Olyphant."
Of course, such a proceeding would only result in a
change of plaintiffs to a riparian owner on the other stream
who could complain with justice that an artificial watercourse was used to pollute his stream. Indeed, to throw
the water "toward Olyphant" would require it to be piped
across Meadow Brook, its natural drain.
IIQ. How far would they have been obliged to have
dug a ditch to carry the water into Eddy Brook? A. I
wouldn't say to thi brook. I only have reference to the
other side of the hill.
IRecord, p. 70.
2

Record, pp. 139-140.
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"Q. The other side of the hill then-the div.'de? A.
Well I should think 15oo feet would carry it; it inight be
2000. 1500 to 2600 feet, I should think, would carry it.
"Q. Wouldn't a ditch dug from the shaft toward the
divide cross the Meadow Brook? A. Yes, sir; if dug
direct..
"Q. Then they would have been obliged to put' an
aqueduct, or something, in to get water across Meadow
Brook?5 A. A flume would have carried it across; pipes
would have carried it over.
"Q. Water cast on the ground at the point where it
is discharged from Gipsy Gro-ce Breaker would run into
Meadow Brook without any ditch, wouldn't it? A. Yes,
sir; if it didn't waste away in the ground.
"Q. This. Gipsy Grove Breaker is located on the edge
of the swamp; isn't it? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So any water put into the swamp would naturally
go into Meadow Brook? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So that the digging of this ditch iooo feet long
is of no consequence as to getting the water into Meadow
Brook? A. It is more iirept; it gets in quicker and gives
it no chance to waste."
As the report of the case does not clearly give the facts
in relation to the "water-course" the writer feels that no
apology is due for the above extract from the plaintift's
testimony.
While the opinion of Justice WOoDWAR

would give

the reader the impression that the injury complained of
would not have occurred save for the

Cartificial

water-

course from the mines to Meadow Brook,"I it clearly
appears that no substantial difference was thereby occasioned in tne result.
Justice WOObWARD, however, 'appears to have considered the case in this respect analogous, e.g., to Wood v.
Sutliffe,2 where the waste water of a dye-works was pumped
into a stream which it befouled ; and to Barclay v. Coin186 Pa. St., 4o6.
2 i6 Jurist, 75.
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monwealth,' where the wash from a barn-yard was permitted to escape into a spring dedicated by the Penns to
the use of the town of Bedford. His opinion, however,
was carelessly written and was afterward severely criticised
in' argument: Thus, Smith v. Kenrick, ' stated to be of
doubtful value was, on the contrary, applied by AGNEW, J.,

in Locust'Mountain Co. v. Gorrell 3 Fletcher v. Rylands,4
is quoted as containing references not contained in it.
DENMAN, C. J., is quoted as having held in Mason v. Hill,5
whfat he expressly says was merely the plaintiff's contention
in the case; and the injunction in Wood v. Sutliffe, 6 was
said to have been granted when, in fact, it had been
refused.
The judgment of the court below was reversed and a
new trial awarded. All the justices concurred, save Justice PAXSON, who delivered a dissenting opinion 7 remarkable for its vigor and breadth. Said he: "The population,
wealth and improvements (of the mining region) are the
result of mining, and of that alone. The plaintiffs knew
when they purchased their property that they were in a
mining region; they were in a city born of mining operations, and which had become rich and. populous as the
result thereof. They knew that all the mountain streams
in that section were affected by mine water or were liable
to be. Having enjoyed the advantages which coal mining
confers, I see no great hardship nor any violence to equity
in their also accepting the inconvenience necessarily resulting from the business." Continuing, the learned Justice
argued that the defendant had a right to mine its coal and
that it had a right to free its mine of water by pumping if
necessary, for otherwise no mine can be operated. This
right is "a right of property which, when duly exercised,
125 Pa. St., 503.
2'7C. B., 515.
3 9 Phila., 247.

'L. R., I Ex., 28o.
S5 B. &A., I.
6 I6 Jur., 75.
7 6 W. N. C., ioi; 113 Pa. St., 156.
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Mining operations may destroy
begets no responsibility."
the springs upon a neighbor's land by interfering with the
natural subterranean flow, and sinking one well may drain
another. 'Agricultural and mining operations n ay increase
the volume .of water without occasioning an actionable
injury, and the impurity necessarily occasioned- by such
-operation sh6uld give no right of action. If this were not
so, mines could not be operated except by consent of the
riparian owners. .In other words, "the trifling inconvenience to particular persons must sometimes give way tothe
necessities of a great community. Especially is this true
where the leading industrial int&rest of the State is iilvolved,
the prosperity of which affects every household in the
Commonwealth."
The second trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff
for $25o. Plaintiff and defendant each took a writ of error:
The defendant's writ was first heard.' AGNEW, C. J., had
retired from the bench, *andWOODWARD, J., had died. The
case was argued before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GOR-

and STERRETT, JJ. It was urged
in behalf of the coal company that their disposition of the
mine water had been according to universal custom and
common consent ever since coal mining was begun; -but
the Supreme Court held that such a custom would be
unreasonable and unlawful, and affirmed the judgment ii
an opinion by GORDON, J., which, it may be said, added
nothing to the, previous decision. Justice PAXSON again
dissented, and with him agreed Justice. STERRETT, who
had taken his seat on the bench since the'first decision had
been rendered.
Had the plaintiff, Sanderson, been satisfied with the
amount of the verdict, this second decision would have
been final. But the lower court upon the trial of the case
had permitted the defendant -to show "in mitigation of
damages" that the mining of coal was below water level;
that water was necessarily encountered, and that the defendant worked its mine in the ordinary, reasonable and
DON, PAXSON, TRUNtKEY

1 94 Pa. St., 302 (i88o).
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proper method. This admission of testimony and certain
instructions on the question of damages were assigned for
error and held erroneous by the Supreme Court, Justice
TRUNYEY delivering the opinion, in which he spoke approvingly of the former rulings of the court upon the main
,question.
The Supreme Court had thus in three opinions held
that the plaintiff, Sanderson, was entitled to recover damages for the pollution of the stream through the mining
,operations of the coal company, and the case was tried for
a third time before a jury. The defendant asked the Court
to charge that: "If the jury believe from the evidence
that it was impossible for the defendant to mine its coal on
its lands along this stream without discharging the minewater from its mines, and that the mining was done without
malice or negligence, and that no foreign substance was
introduced into the mine-water by the defendant, and that
when the mine-water was so discharged it followed the law
of gravity as directed by the natural conformation of the
land, and flowed by a natural flow into this stream and
thence through, the plaintiff's property, then, even if
thereby the plaintiffs were damaged, it is .a damnum absque
iijuria,and plaintiffs cannot recover."

The Court, in very proper conformity with the decisions
of the Supreme Court, refused so to charge the jury, and a
verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $2872.74.
The situation was extremely serious for the coal company. The verdict was a large one in itself, and every
-iparian owner had an equal right with Sanderson to bring
an action.
Sanderson, himself, might bring other actions to
recover subsequently accruing damages, and it needed no
prophet to predict the time when, in Justice PAXSON'S
phrase, "the subsequent verdicts would be such as to
.empty the cash-b6x of any coal company and make mining
practically impossible." Indeed, it is more than likely, as
,CLARK, J., observed,' that the plaintiff, having thus estab1 113 Pa. St., 144.
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lished his right at law, could ask a Court of Equity to
enjoin its continued violation.
It was, therefore, determined to make a last endeavor
to induce the Supreme Court to reconsider their decision
and to establish a rule more favorable to the coal miningindustry so closely connected with the prosperity of the
Commonwealth.
The Court was now composed of MERCUR, C. J., GoRDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN and CLARK JJ. Of these, GoluON and TRUNKEY, JJ., had already
delivered opinions favorable to the plaintiff. PAxSoN and
STERRETT, JJ., had dissented iii favor of the defeiidant.
MERCUR, C. J., had agreed with the majority of the Court.,
but GREEN, J., was not on the bench when the case was
first argued, and was absent when the second and third
arguments took place. CLARK, J., was a member of the
Court when the question of the measure of the damages.
was argued, but was absent, so that Justices GREEN and
CLARK had had no ocasion to express their opinion upon
the case.
The argument made' in behalf of the coal company
was successful. A bare majority of the Court reversed the
judgment of the Court below, MERCUR, C. J.,.GORDON and
TRuNKEY, JJ., adhering to their original opiniofis,
On the one hand, the Court was met by the wellknown rule repeatedly applied in Pennsylvania that a
riparian owner cannot pollute or contaminate a.stream of
water flowing through his land; on the other hand, they
were confronted with the disastrous consequences which
would follow the application of the rule to the case at bar.
It is perhaps not too much to say that no case ever arose in
Pennsylvania of equal, certainly none of greater, importance
to the industrial and material prosperify of the State.
It may be well at this point to refer to some of the
prior decisions in this State.
In Howell v. McCoy,' a tanner was entitled by contract
1 3 Rawle, 256 (1832).

TH,
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with the riparian owners to the use of so much of the water
of the stream as should be necessary for the supply of his.
tan-yard, and covenanted to return to the stream all-water
which should thus be conducted to his yard over and above
the quantity which should be necessarily used in his business. The tanner claimed under this lease the right to
return the water to the stream mixed with the greasy and
poisonous matter it acquired in the process of manufacture.
But the well-established principle was followed that the
corruption of a stream of water is actionable-a principle
as old as the common law. The facts of this case are only
alluded to in order to call attention to the argument made
for the defendant, that it was a practical necessity for him
thus to dispose of the waste from his business, and that the
strict enforcement of the rule would prove injurious to
"the manufacturing establishments which are arising so
rapidly in this country."
The answer of the Court was "that is no reason why
private rights should be injured."
In Commonwealth v. Lyons' the defendants were the
owners of land over which ran a creek on which they had
erected an iron furnace, forge and mills. They washed
their ore with the water and thus corrupted it to the
damage of the inhabitants on the creek below them. They
were indicted (apparently for a nuisance) and convicted.;
the only question raised was whether the indictment was
brought in the proper county.
Wheatley v. Chrisman, 2 came very close in its facts
to the Sanderson case. There the upper riparian owner
had a lead mine on his land and pumped the impure water
from the mine into the channel of the stream, so that the
same was rendered unfit for watering cattle and for the
domestic purposes of the plaintiff. The quantity of water
was also diminished. The disputed questions of fact were
determined by a jury in favor of the plaintiff, who obtained
the verdict. The defendant claimed in error that he had
Ii

Clark, 497 (1843).
Pa. St., 298 (1855).
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a right to use a reasonable quantity of the water for the
purposes of his business, but Judge BLACK, in his most
trenchant manner, said there was no difficulty in the case.
Said he: "The necessities of one man's business cannot
be the standard of another's right in a thing which belongs
to both. The true rule was given to the jury. The defendant had a right to such use as he could make of the
water without materially diminishing it in quantity or-corruitingit in qualty. If he needed more, he was bound to

buy-it. However laudable his enterprise may be, he cannot carry it on at the expense of his neighbor. One who
desires to work a lead mine may require land and inoney
as well as water, but he cannot have either -unless he first
makes it his own."
Justice PAX.SON, in his dissenting opinion in the Sanderson case,' refers to this case in connection with Howell
-v. McCoy,' and McCallum v. Water Works,' as having no
application, because in each of them "the water had been
fouled by the admixture of dyestuffs or some other injurious substance."
This criticism applies to Howell v.
McCoy and McCallum v. "Germantown Water Works; but
it is impossible to see any difference between pumping
water out of a lead mine into a stream and pumping water
out of a coal mine, as in either case the water in the stream
is rendered unfit for use.
For all that appears it was just as necessary to pump
the water out of the lead mine in order to work it properly
as to free the coal mine of water. The lead water had to
go somewhere and the mining company had- apparently
the same right to rid themselves of it by means of the natural water ourse by which their works were placed as the
Pennsylvania Coal Company had to use Meadow Brook for
the same purpose.
From the standpoint of this case the plea of necessity
is brushed aside much as the starving man's excuse is not
113 Pa. St., 157.
23 Rawle, 256.
54 Pa. St., 46.
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regarded as a defence in a prosecution for the theft of food,
although his necessity may appeal to our sympathy. It is
hard to understand why Justice WOODWARD did not cite
this case, especially as it seems to have been referred to in
.argument.'
Wheatley v. Baugh,2 was decided in the same year as
Wheatley v. Chrisman. " The same defendant appeared in
the case, but this time his alleged tort arose from the working of a copper mine. Chrisman sunk a shaft on his ground
and so drained a spring on the plaintiff's premises. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffhad no cause of action
in the absence of any malice or negligence in the conduct
of the mining operations. It appeared that the spring depended for its supply upon percolations alone, and that no
distinct water course had been cut off or diverted. "In
-conducting extensive mining operations," said the Court,
"it is in general impossible to preserve the flow of the subterranean waters through the interstices in which they
-have usually passed, and many springs must be necessarily
-destroyed in order that the proprietors of valuable minerals
may enjoy their own. The public interest is greatly promoted by protecting this right, and it is just that the imperfect rights and lesser advantage should give place to
that which is perfect and infinitely the most beneficial to
individuals and the community at large." And, in another
place: " The law has never gone so far as to recognize in
one man the right to convert another's farm to his own
use for the purposes of a filter." This case was followed in
Haldeman v. Bruckhart.'
Justice PAXSON cited Wheatley v. Baugh in his dissent in the Sanderson case; but the distinction seems to
be that in Wheatley v. BaughI "it was impossible for him
(Wheatley) to know from whence the supply of water came.
He had no knowledge that it was derived from percolations
-through his owif land. In this respect there is a material
1 86 Pa. St., 402.
2 25 Pa. St., 528 (I855).

'45 Pa. St., 514 (1863).
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difference between hidden veins of water under the ground:
and water courses flowing on the surface." And again,
the opinion in Wheatley v. Baugh admitted that 'Iasubterranean stream which supplies a spring witb water cannot be diverted by the proprietor above for the mere purpose of appropriating the water for his own use."
In 'he New Boston Coal and Mining Company v..
Pottsville Water Company,' the Court refused to issue an
injunction against a coal company which drained its mine
into a creek, but the decision went on other grounds and:
the Court expressed no opinion on the merits.
Kauffman v. Griesemer,2 and Martin v. Riddle 8 recognize the principle that the volume of water, in a stream'
may be increased by the superior riparian owner in the
improvement of his land. But an act of the legislature
was considered necessary to enable the owner of swampy
ground to extend his drain over the land of others "in order
to effect the agricultural improvement and development of
his land" and thiswas not permitted without compensation
to the person injured.'
'54 Pa.St., 164.
2

26 Pa. St., 407 (I856).

Pa. St., 415 (1848).
4The Act of Assembly reads as follows: "When the owner or owners
of wet. or spouty land, in this commonwealth, shall desire to improve
the same for agricultural purposes, by surface or under drains, or both,
and when, from any cause, it becomes necessary to extend said drains,
upfon or over the land of other owners, in order to render them effectual,
the person or persons'so desiring to drain, may present a petition to thecourt of quarter sessions of the county wherein such land may be, setting,
forth the situation thereof, and the necessityfor an e.;tensibon of the proposed drain or drains upon or over the landof such othkr owners, specifying the probable extent thereof, and thereupon the said court shall
appoint three judicious persons to view the proposed drain or drains ;.
and said viewers shall view the same, and if they, or a majority'of them,
shall agree that there is occasion for such extension of such drain or
drains, in orderto effect the agriculturalimprovement and development
of said land, they, or a majority of them, shall proceed to lay out the
same, having respect to the shortest distance and the best ground for the
location thereof, and in such manner as shall do the least injury topirivate property, and also be, as faf as practicable, agreeable to the desire
of the petitioners, and make report to the next term of said court of their326
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This "drainage act' was subsequently extended to
-several counties so as "to authorize the drainage and ventilating of coal and other mines, or banks, stone quarries,
etc., in over or under the lands of other owners by drains,
shafts, drifts or otherwise,"' and the anthracite coal mine
act of June 3o , 1885, P. L., 218, Art. IV, the bituminous
coal mine acts of March 3, 187o, P. L., 3, § 4, June 3o ,
1885, P. L., 205, § 7, and May 15, 1893, P. L., 52, Art. IV,
provide that a mine owner may make openings or outlets
under, through or upon adjoining lands to meet the requirements of the statutes in regard to the ingress and egress of
the employes, and the drainage and ventilation of the mine.
The last-named act provides also for "a right of way not
exceeding fifteen feet in width from any such opening to
any public road to enable persons to gain entrance to the
mine through such opening or to provide therefrom upon
the surface a water-course of suitable dimensions to a
natural water stream to enable the operator to discharge
-the water'from said mine."
While damages are to be
assessed and paid for such right of way the act is silent
upon the question of the pollution of streams, settled by
Sanderson's case. The third section of the same article
(IX) of this act deserves attention, which provides that
where water has been allowed to accumulate in dangerous
quantities and "can be tapped and set free and flow by its
own gravity to any point of drainage" it shall be lawful
with the approval of the inspector of the district to remove
the danger by driving a drift across property lines if needful; and it .is declared to be unlawful for any person to
obstruct the flow of water from said mine or any part of its
passage to the point of drainage.
'

proceedings; and said viewers, or a majority of them, shall assess the
damages on behalf of theperson entitled thereto, if any, in their opinion,
will ensue from such extension, and report the same, together with a plot

or draft of the drain or drains by them laid out, specifying also whether
the same shall be surface or under-drains." Act of April 4, 1863, P. L.,
293. It may be that this act is unconstitutional. See Rutherford's Case,
72 Pa. St., 82, on the similar Act of May 9, 1871, P. L., 263.
I E.g., Act February 18, 1870, P. L., 197; March 1o, 1871, P. L., 318;
May 19, I871, P. L., 987; March 9, 1872, P. L., 3o3.
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No damages are directed to be assessed by this section.
Let us turn now to the English cases upon the subject
decided prior to Sanderson's case.
Hodgkinson v. Ennor 1 was decided by CocEBURN,
C. J., BLACKBURN and MELLOR, JJ. The .plaintiff was a

paper manufacturer on the banks of a stream which had
its source in a cavern at the foot of a hill. The owner of
the land on the summit of the hill, and, therefore, above
the cavern, erected certain works for the manufacture of lead which he obtained from his land. The water, f6uled
in the process of manufacture, passed from the pits in
Which it was used through drains into what'were known as
"swallets "-i. e., fissures or rents immemorially existing
in the limestone rock of which the hill was composed.
Through these fissures the water found its way into the
cavern, and so polluted the stream to the detriment of the
plaintiff, who was held entitled to judgment. Indeed, the
Court did not hesitate to compare the case to Tenant v.
Goldwin' (an action for damages caused by the non-repair
of a privy well), and to quote the remark there made, "he
whose dirt it is must keep it that it may not trespass." In
Hodgkinson v. Ennor it appears singularly enough that the
lead existed in the defendant's land in the shape of minute
particles and bits of ore which had "before the time of
living memory" been brought there from distant parts to•
be smelted-the soil practically representing the debris of
an ancient manufactory. So that it might be queried
whether the lead was "naturally" in the soil and its mining a natural use in the phraseology adopted in Sanderson's
case.
Bainbridge on Mines says of this case, Hodgkinson v.
Ennor, in the third edition of the work, page 88 : "' If this
judgment be correct and be strictly applied, it would follow
that a mine owner in the proper exercise of his right might,
in some cases, withdraw the whole of the water arising
14 Best

& Smith,

2 1 Salk., 36o.

229

(1863).
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from springs, but that he could not disturb it by pollution."
But this passage seems to be omitted in the fourth edition.'
In Magor v. Chadwick' the suit was by a brewer
against a miner for fouling the stream -the water of which
was used in the brewery. It appeared that the stream had
its source in an abandoned level made for the purpose of
mining at some remote period. The water issuing therefrom was pure and passed by a distinct water-course over
the plaintiffis land, and the plaintiff had had continued and
uninterrupted enjoyment of the water in its pure state for
thirty-six years. The defendant reopened the ancient mine
and the water was drained therefrom into the old level and
fouled the water of the stream. The trial judge left the
question to the jury whether the evidence proved the exist-ence of an alleged custom in Cornwall authorizing a mineowner to resume such use of an " adit" or level after an
abandonment of twenty years, and ruled that in the absence
of such custom a riparian owner using the artificial stream
for twenty years acquired the same right as in a natural
stream. A rule for a new trial was discharged, DENMAN,
C. J., delivering the opinion of the court.
In Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co.,' the plaintiff
had for upward of forty years used the Water of a brook to
supply their engines and for general use in their mill. They
claimed a right as riparian owners and also by prescription
so to use the water. The defendants were the owners of a
colliery adjoining the brook about two and a half miles
above the plaintiff's mill, and they habitually pumped the
water from the mine into the brook. This water contained
sulphuric acid and other impurities which corroded and
destroyed the plaintiff's boilers and machinery, causing
considerable damage. The claim made by defendants as
riparian owners and as entitled by prescription to enjoy the
water of the stream in its natural purity was not denied by
the defendants, who alleged that as matter of fact the.
'See p. 233.
ii A. & R., 571.
2 L. R., 5, Ch. Div., 769; S. C., 37, L. T. N. S., 149.
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injury was not caused by their operations but by other
causes, and further that at most damages should be awarded
but not an injunction, the effect of which would be to close
their colliery. The 'report states that the defendants
claimed a right to continue to pump.the'.mine-water into
the brook, and that even if their mines were closed in
obediehce to an injunction, the water would ultimately find
its way by natural channels into the brook and pollute it as
much as ever. They further alleged that the colliery
employed 5oo. men, who would be thrown out of work if
the colliery were closed, and that the entire capital stock of
the coal company, amounting to C19,0o,ooo, would-be lost,

-whereas the damage to the plaintiff's boilers did not
amount to £ioo a year. The court awarded an injunction.
While this case was relied upon by Justice WOODWARD
in the first opinion rendered in Sanderson v. The Coal Company, it was strongly urged in I 13 Pa. St. that, as the plaintiff's prescriptive rights were admitted, and the question
debated was whether an injunction or damages should be
awarded, the case decided nothing on the question raised
in Sanderson's. case, and was not authority. This view was
adopted by the Supreme Court, Justice CLARK holding that
the right of a riparian owner was neither discussed nor decided. Careft1 consideration of this case and the other Euglish authorities constrains the writer, contrary to his first
impression, to believe that this case did not discuss or decide the question merely for the reason that the question
was not considered doubtful.,
I (The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 39 and 4oVict., C. 75,

5;

1876) provided in reference to mining pollutions that every person who
causes to flow into a stream any poisonous, noxious, or polluting solid or
liquid matter proceedingfrom any mine otherthan waterin the same condilion as that in which it has been drainedorraisedfromsuch Viine shall be
deemed to have committed an offence against said act, unless in the case
-ofpoisonous, noxious or poliuting matter, he shows to the satisfaction
-of the court having cognizance of the case that he is using the best practicable and reasonable available means to render harmless the poisonous,
noxious and polluting matter so falling, or flowing, or carried into the
stream.
The act provides for summary remedies by injunction and penalties
for default, and further, that nothing in said act shall legalize any act or
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In White v.Dixon,1 the plaintiff, as riparian owner,
sued an iron mining company for fouling the water of the
stream by pumping into it polluted water from their pits
or shafts by means of drains leading therefrom into the
stream. The defence was, in the first place, that if the
water was not pumped into the stream in this way it would
rise in the shaft until it reached the old levels from which
it would flow into the stream. The water, the defendant
averred, was the natural drainage water of the ground, not
used in any manufacture and uncontaminated by any artificial process. And the defendant further pleaded that it
was necessary for the working of their mines that the water
should be so pumped and discharged.
The plaintiff prayed to have his right as riparian owner
declared and the defendant enjoined.
The report is upon the plaintiff's motion for trial before the Lord Ordinary instead of a trial by jury. The
motion was. granted on account of "the legal questions of
novelty and difficulty in reference to the rights of mineral
proprietors to drain their workings."
The Lord Justice CLERK thought this was a good reason, because the water complained of was not an "opus
manufactum."
And Lord NEAVES said: "I do not say
that the natural drainage of the ground is not pollution
merely because it is not the result of a manufacture, if it
be produced or used in an unusual way." 2
default which would, but for the act, be deemed to be a nuisance, or
otherwise contrary to law; and it appears that the act does not affect private rights and duties, nor does it concern the relation which riparian
proprietors bear to one another: Clerk & Lindsell Torts, 312.
2 Sessions Cases, Scotch, 4 Series, 904 (1875).
2
2 The writer has, after diligent search, not been able to find any subsequent report of this case, discussing and deciding it on its merits. The
reader may also refer to Elwell v. Crowther, 31 Beavan, 163; Jegon v.
Vivian, 6 Ch. Ap., 758; Wright v. Villiams, I M. & V., 77, where pollution from mine water seems to be considered as under the ordinary
rules, though the report only concerns a question of pleading: Wood v.
Waud, 3 Exch., 748. MacSwinney on Mines, 396, says a riparian owner
may, by pumping water from his mines into a stream, "alter its quality
in a reasonable degree," but "may not sensibly alter its quality." Authority for this somewhat ambiguous statement is wanting, and apparently no other writer is of like opinion.
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I
If Justice WOODWARD, in 86 Pa. St., 401, had, in
affirming the judgment of the lower court, recited the general rule on the subject of the pollfition of streams as followed in Howell v. McCoy' and other cases, referred to the
English cases above cited, and Wheatley v. Chrisman, 2 as
applying the general rule to cases of mining and met the
argument founded on the public importance of the case by
the answer that the public welfare is better maintained by
preserving the legal rights of the individual than by subordinating them to antagonistic interests however greatif his opinion had followed this line of thought the subsequent reversal Would have been more difficult of accomplishment. But the opinion was founded in great part
upon a case which seems, upon careful examination, to
have no application-that of Pletcher v. Rylands.3
Having now reached a point where an analysis of
Rylands v. Fletcher is necessary, that analysis, and considerations suggested by it, will form the subject of a
second paper.
1 3 Rawle, 256.
2 24 Pa. St., 298.
33 H. & C., 774; L. R., i Exch., 280, S. C.; L. R. ,3 H. L., 330.

